The Treason Clause Is a Catch-22

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The tensions rising between Great Britain and the American colonies in the 18th century, such as taxes disproportionately rising for the colonies, fueled dissent among the colonists against the monarchy. Yet, such dissent—whether it was simply ideological or political—that threatened the power or prevailing order of Great Britain was widely categorized as treason, particularly in the case of the colonists. The Framers of the United States Constitution, directly encountering the injustices of treason charges, clearly defined treason and established safeguards that protected the freedom of expression and thought of those being tried for the crime in the Treason Clause in Article III, Section 3. The Clause, however, is a catch-22: compelling and particular proof is required to convict one of treason, complicating the process and resulting in very few cases ever convicted of treason. Simultaneously, this process protects those being wrongfully convicted.

Though the Framers aimed to stray away from any ambiguity that may engender an abuse of power, the constitutional protection of the Clause narrows the scope of the offense, making it an umbrella term for many other similar crimes. The two types of actions that are defined as treasonous are: (1) “levying war” against the United States, or (2) “adhering to [the] enemies [of the United States], giving them aid and comfort.” The testimony of two witnesses or a confession from the person being tried is also required as part of procedural requirements. Scholars Paul Crane and Deborah Pearlstein identify the distinction between treasonous action versus thought the Framers weaved in the Clause, increasing the complexity of convicting one of treason as they must have taken concrete action against the national security of the United States. In Cramer v. United States (1945), the lawyers of Anthony Cramer, being tried because he assisted German soldiers in invading American land, argued treason charges should be reserved in times of war. This made convicting one of treason complicated because “levying war” implies one must have been unequivocally involved in an armed rebellion against the United States, and this would occur usually only in times of war. Requiring the testimony of two witnesses or either a confession, the Clause becomes even more complex as further evidence is required rather than solely circumstantial evidence that may convict an innocent person. Thus, what may seem as treason is subverted to, as Pearlstein says, “treason by any other name.” Frequently, cases of suspected treason that do not meet the particular needs of the Clause are convicted of espionage. This is seen in Rosenberg v. United States (1953), when couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of espionage rather than treason for revealing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union solely because they did not meet all the safeguards of the Clause.

Today, the Clause still remains complex. The January 6 insurrection of Capitol Hill by supporters of Donald J. Trump, though widely considered treason by the left-leaning American population, has not yet been tried for treason. Scholars believe the complexity the trial imposes legally, as well as the historically few cases convicted of treason, causes prosecutors to shy away from advancing with their argument. This implores us as Americans to think: Has the day come to modify the Clause to portray modern day America in context of the January 6 riot? How do we reconstruct a Clause that is free of political bias and inclusive of all Americans and their political views?

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