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The Treason Clause Is a Catch-22

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The tensions rising between Great Britain and the American colonies in the 18th century, such as taxes disproportionately rising for the colonies, fueled dissent among the colonists against the monarchy. Yet, such dissent—whether it was simply ideological or political—that threatened the power or prevailing order of Great Britain was widely categorized as treason, particularly in the case of the colonists. The Framers of the United States Constitution, directly encountering the injustices of treason charges, clearly defined treason and established safeguards that protected the freedom of expression and thought of those being tried for the crime in the Treason Clause in Article III, Section 3. The Clause, however, is a catch-22: compelling and particular proof is required to convict one of treason, complicating the process and resulting in very few cases ever convicted of treason. Simultaneously, this process protects those being wrongfully convicted.

Though the Framers aimed to stray away from any ambiguity that may engender an abuse of power, the constitutional protection of the Clause narrows the scope of the offense, making it an umbrella term for many other similar crimes. The two types of actions that are defined as treasonous are: (1) “levying war” against the United States, or (2) “adhering to [the] enemies [of the United States], giving them aid and comfort.” The testimony of two witnesses or a confession from the person being tried is also required as part of procedural requirements. Scholars Paul Crane and Deborah Pearlstein identify the distinction between treasonous action versus thought the Framers weaved in the Clause, increasing the complexity of convicting one of treason as they must have taken concrete action against the national security of the United States. In Cramer v. United States (1945), the lawyers of Anthony Cramer, being tried because he assisted German soldiers in invading American land, argued treason charges should be reserved in times of war. This made convicting one of treason complicated because “levying war” implies one must have been unequivocally involved in an armed rebellion against the United States, and this would occur usually only in times of war. Requiring the testimony of two witnesses or either a confession, the Clause becomes even more complex as further evidence is required rather than solely circumstantial evidence that may convict an innocent person. Thus, what may seem as treason is subverted to, as Pearlstein says, “treason by any other name.” Frequently, cases of suspected treason that do not meet the particular needs of the Clause are convicted of espionage. This is seen in Rosenberg v. United States (1953), when couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of espionage rather than treason for revealing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union solely because they did not meet all the safeguards of the Clause.

Today, the Clause still remains complex. The January 6 insurrection of Capitol Hill by supporters of Donald J. Trump, though widely considered treason by the left-leaning American population, has not yet been tried for treason. Scholars believe the complexity the trial imposes legally, as well as the historically few cases convicted of treason, causes prosecutors to shy away from advancing with their argument. This implores us as Americans to think: Has the day come to modify the Clause to portray modern day America in context of the January 6 riot? How do we reconstruct a Clause that is free of political bias and inclusive of all Americans and their political views?

The bibliography of this written component has been submitted on Google LTI. 

A Deconstruction of the 4th (and why its meaning has changed)

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The writs of assistance were search warrants issued to British law enforcement officers to search ships and homes for smuggled goods to upkeep smuggling laws. These writs of assistance and general warrants that England was imposing on the colonial homes and businesses, specifically to enforce trade and navigation laws, must have concerned the authors of the Bill of Rights. Limiting the power the government has on searching and seizing the peoples’ property would especially be an anti-federalist goal since they advocated for individual liberties.   

The common interpretation of the fourth amendment centers around safeguarding the security of individuals, ensuring that neither they nor their belongings can be encroached upon or violated without a reasonable warrant. Warrants are typically awarded to enforcement officers by a judge or a magistrate and must be produced based on probable cause, or be reasonable enough to confiscate or enter your property. Additionally, warrants must be clear about what they will allow authorities to collect or search. The goal of the fourth amendment is that of maintaining citizens’ privacy and security so that you and your property cannot be intruded on or violated without a warrant.   

The exclusionary evidence rule makes all evidence that has been collected illegally, void. The Fourth Amendment has sparked debate over whether the methods of search for the collection of evidence are legal or not. Recently, the controversy has centered due to a shift of applications from physical property, such as the search of your house or your belongings, to informational or intellectual property, such as the mass collection of your internet metadata. Specifically, digital privacy, or the safeguarding of logs that internet providers or telecommunications companies store on servers has been at issue, since the information citizens feel violated by the collection and search of their personal, otherwise private data. On the other hand, the search and collection of evidence helps catch serious criminals who wouldn’t have been otherwise caught. This complicates matters because who decides when the collection is necessary and when it is intrusive?   

Locke considered the right to private property a natural right. Locke’s enlightenment ideals align with the fourth amendment right to no seizure without a proper warrant because he believed the property was private.  I find the interpretation times have changed argument more effective because it points out the similarities between physical and non-physical property. The conflict I come to with the argument that informational property should be treated the same as physical is that times have changed, and oftentimes, there is more information about us online than in our own homes. We should have the right to keep that information private. Although the data is available to internet companies, internet companies do not have the power to arrest you on your own, but the government does. The collection of data can fall under the Fourth Amendment depending on who is collecting it. If I could amend the Fourth Amendment, I would make a point to differentiate what rights people have regarding the security of their physical property versus their digital property.