the-treason-clause

The Treason Clause Is a Catch-22

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The tensions rising between Great Britain and the American colonies in the 18th century, such as taxes disproportionately rising for the colonies, fueled dissent among the colonists against the monarchy. Yet, such dissent—whether it was simply ideological or political—that threatened the power or prevailing order of Great Britain was widely categorized as treason, particularly in the case of the colonists. The Framers of the United States Constitution, directly encountering the injustices of treason charges, clearly defined treason and established safeguards that protected the freedom of expression and thought of those being tried for the crime in the Treason Clause in Article III, Section 3. The Clause, however, is a catch-22: compelling and particular proof is required to convict one of treason, complicating the process and resulting in very few cases ever convicted of treason. Simultaneously, this process protects those being wrongfully convicted.

Though the Framers aimed to stray away from any ambiguity that may engender an abuse of power, the constitutional protection of the Clause narrows the scope of the offense, making it an umbrella term for many other similar crimes. The two types of actions that are defined as treasonous are: (1) “levying war” against the United States, or (2) “adhering to [the] enemies [of the United States], giving them aid and comfort.” The testimony of two witnesses or a confession from the person being tried is also required as part of procedural requirements. Scholars Paul Crane and Deborah Pearlstein identify the distinction between treasonous action versus thought the Framers weaved in the Clause, increasing the complexity of convicting one of treason as they must have taken concrete action against the national security of the United States. In Cramer v. United States (1945), the lawyers of Anthony Cramer, being tried because he assisted German soldiers in invading American land, argued treason charges should be reserved in times of war. This made convicting one of treason complicated because “levying war” implies one must have been unequivocally involved in an armed rebellion against the United States, and this would occur usually only in times of war. Requiring the testimony of two witnesses or either a confession, the Clause becomes even more complex as further evidence is required rather than solely circumstantial evidence that may convict an innocent person. Thus, what may seem as treason is subverted to, as Pearlstein says, “treason by any other name.” Frequently, cases of suspected treason that do not meet the particular needs of the Clause are convicted of espionage. This is seen in Rosenberg v. United States (1953), when couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of espionage rather than treason for revealing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union solely because they did not meet all the safeguards of the Clause.

Today, the Clause still remains complex. The January 6 insurrection of Capitol Hill by supporters of Donald J. Trump, though widely considered treason by the left-leaning American population, has not yet been tried for treason. Scholars believe the complexity the trial imposes legally, as well as the historically few cases convicted of treason, causes prosecutors to shy away from advancing with their argument. This implores us as Americans to think: Has the day come to modify the Clause to portray modern day America in context of the January 6 riot? How do we reconstruct a Clause that is free of political bias and inclusive of all Americans and their political views?

The bibliography of this written component has been submitted on Google LTI. 

The Treason Clause – Lauren Nam

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The Constitution’s framers’ intention by writing the treason clause was not to enforce strict loyalty to America onto the citizens but to prevent the abuse of treason prosecution. Recognizing the historic misuse of accusations of treason to stamp out political oppositions, in order to avoid forming a repressive government, this clause attempts to expressly define the act of treason and enforce restrictions for prosecution. 

Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 constitutes treason against the United States only as two types of actions. The first act considered treason is declaring war. The second act is assisting and abetting an enemy of the United States. The second half of this clause establishes safeguards against prosecution of treason. To be convicted of treason, this clause requires at least two witnesses to testify to have seen the same explicitly treasonous act or the defendant to confess in open court.

Although these two umbrellas of actions may seem vague, the Court has interpreted this clause very narrowly, in line with the Framers’ original intentions, and has only indicted one person of treason since 1954. By writing this clause, the Framers limited Congress’ ability to define treason and instated difficult parameters to proving the crime.

The Court’s interpretation of the definitions of treason over the years have remained specific, with the Court, in many cases, reaffirming the distinction between conspiring to and actually levying war. In the case of Ex parte Bollman & Swarthout (1807), which pertained to the covert plot of Aaron Burr to overthrow the New Orleans government and tried two of his associates, both defendants were dismissed of their charges.

The necessity of concrete action and not just sentiment or expression against the United States in order to convict a person of treason, is a protection of the first Amendment and the rights of citizens. Under the treason clause, the Court found that the actions of Bollman and Swarthout were insufficiently carried out to be considered treasonous acts, establishing that intent alone cannot incriminate someone. However, as illustrated in subsequent cases, intent is pivotal in meeting the strict parameters that the Treason Clause requires to meet.

Article III, Section 3, Clause 2 grants Congress the power to decide the punishment of treason, however, protects the right of the family members to inherit property of those convicted of treason after such person has died. The clause specifically mentions, “Corruption of Blood”, a reference to English Common Law. In order to diverge from English Common law, in which Corruption of Blood was the automatic punishment of attainder for treason, the Framers prevent the consequences of treason beyond the convict’s life. 

While the Framers were trying to prevent the abuse of the treason clause, the French were on the brink of revolution. The French Revolution, specifically the reign of terror, unfolded in events that the Constitution was actively fighting against. The paranoia and fear of counter revolution which characterized the period led to mass executions and public unrest. The bloody events of the reign of terror is a testament to the necessity of the treason clause.